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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________________ 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 Richard McNaughton and Igor Veksler appeal from the 
judgments of conviction and sentences entered against them by the 
district court.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm 
the district court's orders. 
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 During 1991 and 1992, McNaughton and Veksler were 
involved in a scheme to evade federal and state taxes on sales of 
number two oil, a product that can be used as either home heating 
oil or diesel fuel.  During this period, no taxes were imposed by 
the federal government or either New Jersey or Pennsylvania on 
the sale of number two oil for use as home heating oil.  In 
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contrast, the United States, New Jersey and Pennsylvania did tax 
the sale of number two oil when it was to be used as diesel fuel, 
and imposed that tax on the producer or importer who first sold 
the oil to a purchaser that did not hold a Registration for Tax-
Free Transactions (IRS Form 637).    
 The tax evasion scheme in which McNaughton and Veksler 
participated involved the use of "daisy chains," a series of 
paper transactions through numerous companies, some of which were 
largely fictitious.  In each "daisy chain," the change in 
characterization of number two oil from tax-free home heating oil 
to taxable diesel fuel was effected through the use of a "burn 
company," which would purchase number two oil as tax-free home 
heating oil and then sell it to another company as diesel fuel.   
The burn company, which typically held an IRS Form 637, would 
produce invoices to its purchaser reflecting that the diesel fuel 
taxes had been paid and that the taxes were included in the 
price.  Although the burn company was liable for the payment of 
taxes on the oil, it paid no taxes and typically existed for a 
brief time and then disappeared.  The participants in the scheme 
took commissions on the sales at the step in which each 
participated. 
 On September 19, 1993, the United States filed a 
superseding indictment charging eighteen different defendants 
with various offenses related to the "daisy chain" operation. 
Both McNaughton and Veksler were charged with one count of 
conspiracy.  McNaughton was also charged with twenty-three counts 
of wire fraud, three counts of attempted tax evasion, and RICO 
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conspiracy.1  In addition to the conspiracy count, Veksler was 
charged with six counts of wire fraud and one count of attempted 
tax evasion. 
 On May 23, 1994, after a twenty-day trial, the jury 
convicted McNaughton on all counts.  Veksler was convicted of the 
conspiracy and wire fraud counts and acquitted on the tax evasion 
counts.  McNaughton was sentenced to a prison term of forty 
months, five years of supervised release, and a special 
assessment of $1,400.00.  Veksler was sentenced to a prison term 
of twenty-six months, followed by three years of supervised 
release.  These appeals followed. 
II. 
Discussion 
 A. Appeal No. 94-2079--McNaughton 
 McNaughton was the president of BELL/ASCO, a 
Pennsylvania corporation that was in the business of making 
purchases and sales of number two oil.  Prior to April 1, 1992, 
BELL/ASCO allegedly played a dual role in the "daisy chain" 
scheme by both supplying number two oil to the chain and buying 
oil at the end of the chain.  After April 1, 1992, BELL/ASCO 
served only as a supplier and a new company, ASCA/NOVA, purchased 
oil at the end of the chain.  ASCA/NOVA, however, operated from 
the same office as BELL/ASCO. 
  1. Did the district court err in refusing to 
suppress McNaughton's statement to Perry on 
December 1, 1992? 
 
                     
1A RICO forfeiture count under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) was also 
brought against McNaughton. 
5 
 On November 24, 1992, the government executed a search 
warrant at Atlantic Heating and Oil, BELL/ASCO's parent 
corporation.  During the course of the search, McNaughton was 
interviewed in his office by an FBI Agent and a Pennsylvania 
Revenue Enforcement Officer.  Sometime during the interview, 
McNaughton left his office to speak with Mr. Thomas Smida, an 
attorney who had arrived to represent Atlantic in connection with 
the execution of the search warrant.  After conferring with 
Smida, McNaughton informed the agents that Smida did not want him 
to make any more statements.  Later, Smida was present when an 
agent elicited background information from McNaughton.  Smida, 
however, halted the interview when an agent asked McNaughton 
about his tax returns.  Smida was also present when McNaughton's 
briefcase was searched. 
 On November 30, 1992, FBI Agent Sid Perry called 
McNaughton and invited him to the FBI office in Philadelphia to 
review the evidence against him.  On December 1, 1992, McNaughton 
went to the FBI office, where he was interviewed by Agent Perry. 
During the course of the interview, McNaughton admitted (1) that 
he was involved in "daisy chain" deals, (2) that the price of oil 
purchased through the "daisy chains" was too low for taxes to 
have been paid, (3) that ASCA/NOVA was established in order to 
avoid BELL/ASCO's appearance at both ends of the chains, and (4) 
that he had received commission payments for his participation in 
the "daisy chain" scheme.  At no time during the interview did 
McNaughton state that he was represented by Mr. Smida or any 
other counsel. 
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 McNaughton contends that because he was represented by 
Smida at the time of Agent Perry's questioning, the district 
court erred by refusing to suppress his statement.  McNaughton 
argues that Perry violated Rule 4.2 of the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Professional Conduct by questioning him,2 and that suppression is 
the appropriate sanction. 
   Rule 4.2 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional 
Conduct provides, in relevant part, that: 
 In representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
communicate about the subject of the representation 
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by 
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to 
do so. 
 
Pa.R.P.C. 4.2.  As the district court concluded, in order for 
McNaughton to prevail on his motion to suppress the court would 
have to find (1) that the Rule applied to Agent Perry, although 
he is not an attorney, (2) that McNaughton was represented by 
counsel when Perry interviewed him on December 1, 1992, or that 
McNaughton is otherwise entitled to protection under the Rule, 
and (3) that suppression of the statement is an appropriate 
remedy for a violation of the Rule. 
 The district court concluded that McNaughton was not 
represented by counsel at the time of the interview.  There is 
adequate support in the record for this conclusion.  During the 
execution of the search warrant at Atlantic, Smida represented 
                     
2The Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct are applicable to 
all actions before the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  See Rule 14.IV(B) of the Local 
Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
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himself as the "company" attorney, and never suggested that he 
represented McNaughton.  App. at 722.  McNaughton also referred 
to Smida as his employer's attorney, and never suggested that 
Smida represented him in a personal capacity.  App. at 723.  In 
addition, on November 25 or 26, 1992, Atlantic informed 
McNaughton that it would not represent him in connection with 
this matter and that he should retain personal counsel.  App. at 
722.  Indeed, at the conclusion of the December 1, 1992, 
interview, McNaughton suggested to Perry that he might retain an 
attorney and asked for Perry's opinion of two possible 
candidates.  App. at 725.  Finally, and most significantly, 
McNaughton testified at the suppression hearing that Smida was 
not representing him personally at the time of the December 1, 
1992 interview.  App. at 2869-70.  In light of these facts, we 
cannot characterize the district court's conclusion that 
McNaughton was not represented at the time of the interview as 
clearly erroneous.  Thus, McNaughton may not invoke the 
protections of Rule 4.2. 
 Nor does McNaughton have standing to invoke Rule 4.2 on 
Atlantic's behalf.  See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
133-34 (1978); United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 732-34 (5th 
Cir.) (defendant lacks standing to assert violation of a third-
party's attorney-client privilege), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 
(1986).  Although Rule 4.2 applies to communication with persons 
having managerial responsibility on behalf of a represented 
organization, see Pa. R.P.C. 4.2 (Comment), we need not decide 
whether Perry's questioning of McNaughton violated Rule 4.2 as it 
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applies to Atlantic, because McNaughton could not invoke any such 
violation as a basis for his suppression motion. 
   It follows that the district court did not err in 
denying McNaughton's motion to suppress his statements to Perry 
on December 1, 1992.3 
 
  2. Did the district court err in denying 
McNaughton's motion to suppress the wiretap 
information? 
 
 McNaughton contends that the district court erred by 
refusing to suppress the wiretap information in this case because 
the warrant for those wiretaps was granted on the basis of 
information obtained through the use of a pen register.  While 
McNaughton acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the use of pen registers without a warrant in Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), he contends that the Smith 
decision was based upon the fact that pen registers were 
incapable of intercepting conversations.  McNaughton argues that 
modern technological advances, which have permitted the 
development of pen registers that can be turned into listening 
devices with the mere turn of a switch, merit reconsideration of 
the Supreme Court's position.  At a minimum, he reasons, he 
should be permitted to conduct discovery regarding the use of the 
pen register and the government policies regarding such use. 
                     
3Because we find that McNaughton was neither represented at the 
time of the interview nor otherwise entitled to the protections 
of Rule 4.2, we need not address whether suppression is the 
appropriate remedy for a violation of Rule 4.2.   
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 We would not be so presumptuous as to limit Smith, a 
Supreme Court decision, in the manner suggested by McNaughton. In 
any event, McNaughton concedes that he has no evidence that the 
pen register was used to record any information other than 
telephone numbers.  The mere suggestion that pen register 
equipment is now capable of misuse does not give us a basis to 
depart from the controlling precedent of the Smith case.  The 
district court therefore did not err in failing to suppress the 
wiretap and in concluding that McNaughton is not entitled to 
additional discovery on that issue. 
 
  3. Did the district court err in declining to 
order the government to disclose information 
regarding Hurchalla's status as a subject of 
a grand jury investigation? 
 
 McNaughton filed a post-trial motion for information on 
the status of a grand jury investigation in connection with 
Charles Hurchalla, one of the government's trial witnesses, at 
the time that Hurchalla began to cooperate with the government. 
McNaughton suggests that by failing to disclose this information, 
the government may have violated its obligations under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972).  The district court denied 
McNaughton's request, holding that the outcome of the trial would 
not have been different if the government had disclosed the 
requested information.  App. at 263-64. 
 McNaughton asserts that the grand jury investigation 
conducted by the Office of the Inspector General of the 
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Department of Transportation concerned possible fraud and false 
statements in connection with minority set-aside programs.  The 
only possible relevance of this information, sought at this late 
date, would be in support of a motion for a new trial.  In order 
to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must first 
demonstrate that the prosecution failed to disclose pro-defense 
evidence "actually or constructively in its possession or 
accessible to it."  United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
 McNaughton does not suggest that the prosecution had 
actual knowledge or cause to know of the ongoing nature of the 
investigation of Hurchalla.  All criminal history checks of 
Hurchalla were negative and Hurchalla himself told the 
prosecution that the investigation had occurred in the 1980s. 
Constructive knowledge can only be found where the defense has 
made a specific request for the information.  See United States 
v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 40-41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 
357 (1993).  The defense made no such request prior to trial, 
even though it had information regarding the existence of the 
investigation.  Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude 
that the prosecution committed a Brady violation.  Id. at 41. 
 Moreover, not every failure to disclose evidence 
favorable to the defense requires a reversal of a conviction. See 
United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 114 S.Ct. 483 (1993).  Rather, the undisclosed evidence 
must also be material.  Id.  "'[E]vidence is material only if 
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
11 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A 'reasonable probability' is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Pennsylvania 
v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (quoting United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (Opinion of Blackmun, J.)).   
 McNaughton contends that the undisclosed evidence could 
have led the jury to conclude that Hurchalla's testimony was 
designed to further his own interests in connection with the 
ongoing grand jury investigation.  As the government notes, 
inasmuch as Hurchalla was unaware of the ongoing nature of the 
investigation and Hurchalla never asked the government to 
intercede on his behalf in connection with any such 
investigation, it is unlikely that the jury would have rejected 
Hurchalla's testimony on the basis of evidence regarding the 
ongoing grand jury investigation.   
 We note also, as the district court concluded, that the 
extensive evidence regarding BELL/ASCO's involvement in the 
"daisy chain" scheme provided ample evidence of McNaughton's 
guilt.  App. at 1616-22, 1634.  There was testimony by Nadezhda 
Shnayderman that McNaughton received commissions for his 
participation in the scheme.  App. at 1204-05.   
 We therefore conclude that the district court did not 
err in refusing to allow McNaughton to conduct further discovery 
into the status of the grand jury investigation. 
  4. Did the district court err in imposing 
McNaughton's sentence? 
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 McNaughton raises various challenges to the district 
court's application of the sentencing guidelines.  We exercise 
plenary review over legal questions about the meaning of the 
sentencing guidelines, but apply the deferential clearly 
erroneous standard to factual determinations underlying their 
application.  See United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 990 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
 First, we find no error in the district court's 
imposition of a two-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 
§2T1.1(b)(2) for McNaughton's use of "sophisticated means" to 
impede discovery of the tax offense.  Application note 4 to 
section 2T1.1 states that "'sophisticated means' . . . includes 
conduct that is more complex or demonstrates greater intricacy or 
planning than a routine tax evasion case."  U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, 
comment. (n.4).  The commentary continues by stating that "[a]n 
enhancement would be applied, for example, where the defendant 
used . . . transactions through corporate shells or fictitious 
entities."  Id.  The "daisy chain" scheme employed by McNaughton 
in this case is plainly covered by this language.4  
 Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in 
declining to grant a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 
for McNaughton's acceptance of responsibility.  Although 
                     
4McNaughton contends that the use of a "sophisticated means" 
enhancement is duplicative and improper where the state and 
federal tax losses were combined to calculate the offense level 
under the Tax Table at U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1.  The imposition of a 
"sophisticated means" enhancement under § 2T1.1(b) is unrelated 
to the calculation of the base offense level from the tax loss 
under § 2T1.1(a). 
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McNaughton made significant admissions to investigating officers 
during the execution of the search warrant and to Agent Perry 
during the December 1, 1992 interview, the record does not 
support the conclusion that he admitted that he personally had 
committed the crimes charged in the indictment.  Moreover, as 
application note 2 of section 3E1.1 suggests, in most cases, 
"[t]his adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who 
puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying 
the essential factual elements of guilt . . . ."  U.S.S.G. 
§3E1.1, comment. (n.2).   
 At sentencing McNaughton sought a downward departure 
under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 due to his medical condition, in that his 
lung function was seriously decreased.  From our review of the 
record, we conclude that the district court's refusal to depart 
was based not on a belief regarding its authority to depart, as 
McNaughton argues, but on McNaughton's failure to present 
evidence sufficient to warrant an exercise of the court's 
discretion under section 5H1.4.  The district court's refusal to 
exercise its discretion to grant a downward departure pursuant to 
section 5H1.4 is therefore not subject to review by this court. 
See United States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 B. Appeal No. 94-1982--Veksler 
 Veksler was the operator of one of the "daisy chain" 
participants, I.V. Enterprises, a Wisconsin corporation that held 
an IRS Form 637, a Pennsylvania oil company franchise tax 
exemption certificate and a New Jersey Special B license. Between 
July 1991 and December 1991, I.V. purchased approximately 
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3,486,000 gallons of number two oil from Self Oil and sold it, on 
paper, to Keroscene, Inc., which served as a burn company in the 
same "daisy chain."  I.V. never received payment for the oil from 
Keroscene, however.  Instead, IV received wire transfers from 
companies to which Keroscene sold the oil.  
  1. Was there sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's guilty verdict on Counts 1-7? 
 
 Veksler argues that the government failed to present 
evidence sufficient to support his wire fraud and conspiracy 
convictions.  In particular, Veksler contends that the government 
failed to present evidence to support the conclusion that Veksler 
had the requisite level of intent to support his convictions 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 371 
(conspiracy). 
 A "claim of insufficiency of the evidence places a very 
heavy burden on an appellant."  United States v. Gonzalez, 918 
F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990) (quotation and citation omitted), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1107 (1991), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 968 
(1991), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982 (1991).  In evaluating the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, the evidence 
at trial is considered in the light most favorable to the 
government.  The "'evidence does not need to be inconsistent with 
every conclusion save that of guilt if it does establish a case 
from which the jury can find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt'."  United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 
(3d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 
254 (3d Cir. 1977)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 (1990). Instead, 
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this Court reviews the evidence to determine whether "any 
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 
U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
 In order to convict a defendant of wire fraud under 18 
U.S.C. § 1343, the government must prove, inter alia, that the 
defendant participated in the scheme with the specific intent to 
defraud.  In Re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 
1249 (3d Cir. 1989).  In order to convict a defendant of 
conspiracy to defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 371, 
the government must prove, inter alia, that the defendant 
intended to defraud the United States.  While the parties appear 
to disagree on whether section 371 requires a showing of 
"willfulness" on the part of the defendant, they do agree that in 
order to demonstrate the requisite intent to support Veksler's 
convictions, the government must demonstrate both (1) that 
Veksler knew of the obligation to pay taxes on the oil sold as 
diesel fuel and (2) that he knew that the purpose and effect of 
his actions was to avoid the payment of such taxes.  See 
Appellant's Brief at 15; Appellee's Brief at 38-39.     
 A review of the record in this case demonstrates that 
the government satisfied its burden of presenting sufficient 
evidence upon which a jury could have based its conviction. 
Dimitry Belokopytov, Veksler's associate at I.V. Enterprises, 
testified that he instructed Veksler to send form letters 
regarding meetings that never occurred to other participants in 
the daisy chain scheme.  App. at 839-41.  Belokopytov also 
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instructed Veksler to send invoices to Keroscene.  The payments 
to I.V., however, were all made by Romans Penn.  These facts are 
sufficient to permit the jury to infer that Veksler was aware 
that his company was not engaged in legitimate business 
activities.  Moreover, Belokopytov also explained to Veksler that 
it was "very important" that I.V.'s papers demonstrate that it 
bought only heating oil and not diesel fuel because heating oil 
was not taxed, while diesel fuel was taxed.  App. at 828-29. This 
testimony was sufficient to permit the jury to infer that Veksler 
knew about both the tax obligations regarding the sale of diesel 
fuel and the tax evasion goals of the scheme in which he 
participated.5  We thus reject Veksler's contention that there 
was insufficient evidence of his specific intent.6 
   2. Did the court err in refusing to depart 
from the sentencing guidelines due to 
Veksler's degree of culpability? 
 
 Veksler also argues that the district court erred in 
refusing to depart from the base offense level applicable to him 
under the Sentencing Guidelines.  Under U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, the 
base offense level for offenses involving taxation is determined 
by the amount of the tax loss.  In this case, the district court 
based its calculation of Veksler's offense level on the  
                     
5This case is therefore distinguishable from United States v 
Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 543 (3d Cir. 1978), where the 
government presented no substantial evidence from which the jury 
could infer that the defendants were, or should have been, aware 
of the fraudulent nature of the scheme.  
6Because we conclude that the government presented adequate 
evidence to support Vecksler's convictions, we need not address 
the issue of whether district court's reliance upon Vecksler's 
testimony as an alternative basis for supporting the convictions 
was proper. 
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approximately $1.4 million in tax losses that could be attributed 
to transactions in which Veksler participated.  See U.S.S.G. 
§§2T1.1(a), 2T4.1.   
 At sentencing, Veksler requested the district court to 
depart from this base offense level because it overstated his 
culpability and because the amount of taxes lost was not 
foreseeable by Veksler under the evidence adduced at trial.  The 
district court rejected Veksler's request, and Veksler reads the 
court's statement as holding that it lacked the authority under 
the Guidelines to grant the requested departure.  We need not 
decide whether the district court had authority to grant the 
requested departure because the court found as a fact that the 
tax loss was foreseeable to Veksler who "participated in a very 
integral part of this entire daisy chain."  App. at 338. 
 Moreover, nothing in section 2T1.1 and its accompanying 
application notes suggests that a court has the discretion to 
depart from the base offense level established through 
calculation of the tax loss.  This case differs significantly 
from those cited by Veksler.  In United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 
793 (3d Cir. 1994), the commentary to the guideline at issue 
expressly permitted a downward departure in certain limited 
circumstances.  Id. at 798-99.  As Veksler points out, in United 
States v. Stuart, 22 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1994), we suggested that in 
certain instances, a court may have the authority to depart even 
in the absence of explicit authorization, but that decision was 
limited to instances where "'a particular guideline 
linguistically applies but . . . the conduct [of a defendant] 
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significantly differs from the norm.'"  Id. at 82-83 (quoting 
United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual 5-6 
(1992)).   
 Veksler has presented no arguable basis for applying 
the exception identified by this court in Stuart.  Section 2T1.1 
patently applies to Veksler, and the facts of this case lack any 
extraordinary circumstances that the Sentencing Commission would 
not have considered in formulating the guideline.  See Stuart, 22 
F.3d at 82.  Thus, we find no error in the district court's 
refusal to grant the departure requested by Veksler. 
III. 
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgments 
of conviction and the sentences imposed by the district court. 
